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Abstract
This paper examines the design of affirmative and silent coverage in view of the 
cyber risks in traditional insurance policies for select product lines on the German 
market. Given the novelty and complexity of the topic and the insufficient coverage 
in the literature, we use two different sources. We analysed the general insurance 
terms and conditions of different traditional insurance lines using Mayring’s qualita-
tive content analysis. Also, we conducted interviews with experts from the German 
insurance industry to evaluate how insurers understand their silent cyber exposures, 
and what measures they take to deal with this new exposure. The study shows a con-
siderable cyber liability risk potential for insurers in the considered insurance lines. 
This arises from the affirmative as well as silent cover inclusions and exclusions for 
cyber risks, which result from imprecise wordings of insurance clauses and insuf-
ficient descriptions of the contractually specified scope of the insurance coverage.
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cyber coverage · Affirmative cyber coverage · Silent cyber
Open access funding provided by Projekt DEAL.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https ://doi.org/10.1057/s4128 
8-020-00183 -6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
 * Dirk Wrede 
 dw@ivbl.uni-hannover.de
 Tino Stegen 
 tino.stegen@hotmail.de
 Johann-Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg 
 jms@ivbl.uni-hannover.de
1 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover, Institute for Risk and Insurance, 
Otto-Brenner-Straße 7, 30159 Hanover, Germany
658 D. Wrede et al.
Introduction
Cyber risks (e.g. cybercrime, IT failure/outage, data breaches, fines and penalties) 
are among the most critical business risks for companies worldwide in the 21st cen-
tury (Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (AGCS) 2020; World Economic Forum 
2020). As a peril, cyber risk can be defined as ‘any risk emerging from the use of 
information and communication technology (ICT) that compromises the confiden-
tiality, availability, or integrity of data or services. The impairment of operational 
technology (OT) eventually leads to business disruption, (critical) infrastructure 
breakdown, and physical damage to humans and property’ (Eling and Schnell 
2016a, b). Generally, data protection-related breaches of obligations and confidenti-
ality, business interruptions and data theft can result in financial damage and reputa-
tion losses (Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Smith 2004; Salmela 2008; Bulgurcu et al. 2010; 
Järveläinen 2013). Over the past two years, for example, cyberattacks caused total 
losses for companies in Germany of around EUR 205.7 billion (Bitkom 2020). 1
In this context, insurance solutions are particularly useful for transferring risks 
from cyber threats to companies (Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu 2010; Tosh 
et al. 2017; Tonn et al. 2019). Three different general categories of cyber coverage 
are available on the insurance market: (1) stand-alone policies, (2) coverage in an 
insurance bundle and (3) silent cyber coverage (Coburn et al. 2016; OECD 2017b; 
EIOPA 2018a). The emergence of possibly overlapping coverage makes it compli-
cated for insurers to design new products. On the one hand, integrating cyber cov-
erage into traditional products creates complexity and opacity (Haas and Hofmann 
2014; Siegel et al. 2018); on the other hand, current cyber coverage often contains 
imprecise insurance terms and conditions and insufficient descriptions of the con-
tractually agreed scope (Baer 2003; Meland et al. 2015, 2017; Marotta et al. 2015, 
2017). The terms and conditions of some policies also entirely lack any relevant 
information for cyber damages (Ruffle et al. 2015). Yet, the wording of the insurance 
terms and conditions, and descriptions of the contractually agreed scope, largely 
determine the structure of cyber coverage (Woods and Simpson 2017).
While new insurance products specifically include or exclude cyber risks, it is 
often unclear whether and to what extent existing policies cover them (Kirkpatrick 
2015; Eling 2018; Siegel et  al. 2018; Woods and Moore 2020). This unintended, 
implicit coinsurance leads to so-called ‘silent cyber risks’ of traditional insurance 
policies (Woods and Simpson 2017; EIOPA 2019). Silent cyber risks are defined 
as cyber risks that arise ‘from implicit cyber exposure within ‘all risks’ and other 
liability insurance policies that do not explicitly exclude cyber risks’ (Bank of Eng-
land Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 2016).
Therefore, insurers face the challenge of identifying silent cyber risks in the vari-
ous traditional insurance policies, in which cyber risks are regularly not mentioned 
or are not explicitly included or excluded. Similarly, in traditional insurance prod-
ucts, cyber risks are often defined, but their subsequent handling is not clear. This 
1 For the causes and costs of cyberattacks, see, for example, Romanosky (2016). On the problem of esti-
mating the economic costs of cybercrime, see Anderson et al. (2013, 2019) and Hyman (2013).
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makes it necessary to systematically identify, analyse and comprehensively quantify 
the existing but hitherto unknown cyber exposure. The aim is to take the individual 
components of existing silent cyber risks into account in the underwriting process. 
A detailed assessment of the existing silent cyber risks may entail uncalculated and 
difficult-to-quantify claim burdens for insurers (Willis Re 2017, 2018, 2019). At the 
same time, a holistic risk assessment should be carried out to reduce uncertainties 
by considering the existing accumulation aspects and developing adequate pricing 
approaches. As a result, insurers could include affirmative and comprehensive cyber 
coverage in their traditional insurance products. The topic of silent cyber exposure 
is also gaining the attention of insurance supervisory authorities (Pain and Anchen 
2017; Eling 2018; Siegel et al. 2018). 2
Even though the significance of affirmative and silent cyber coverage in tradi-
tional insurance products as well as the resulting exposures have been acknowledged 
in practice and research, only a few studies examine the design of cyber coverage 
components in traditional insurance products. The present study contributes to clos-
ing this research gap. It aims to systematically analyse the general terms and condi-
tions of policies in selected insurance lines on the German market with regard to 
affirmative and silent coverage, thereby identify existing silent cyber risks. Expert 
interviews are also evaluated to deduct how the insurance industry is currently deal-
ing with the topic.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: at first a literature overview 
presents the general development of the cyber insurance market. In the process spe-
cial attention will be paid to the supply and demand side. Subsequently, the state of 
research on the design of cyber coverage in insurance products and the legal back-
ground for the German jurisdiction from a theoretical perspective are presented. 
The third section focuses on the methods used and describes research design, data 
collection and evaluation procedures. The consecutive part presents the results of 
the content analysis of the insurance terms and conditions as well as the conducted 
interviews. The second-to-last section discusses and reflects on the results. To con-
clude, summarising remarks are made.
2 International financial supervisory authorities are increasingly warning of considerable silent cyber 
risks in the portfolios of insurance companies. In the U.K., for example, the Bank of England Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA) called on the insurance industry in 2017 to address the problem of cyber 
risks in traditional insurance products and imposed specific requirements for managing silent cyber risks 
(see Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 2017) and asked reinsurers and primary 
insurers to develop a silent cyber action plan by the middle of 2019. In Germany, the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) has also been increasingly concerned with this issue since 2019 and is 
now questioning insurers on their silent cyber risks. This includes collecting information from insurers 
on the number of insurance contracts containing silent cyber risks and how to address this issue in the 
context of a company’s own risk and solvency assessment (ORSA). Similarly, the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) has taken silent cyber risks into account when developing 
its strategy on cyber underwriting. It has also started a number of initiatives and is emphasising its super-
visory concerns, specifically in the area of silent/non-affirmative risks (see EIOPA 2020).
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Literature review and theoretical background
Relationship between cyber insurance markets and the supply and demand 
of cyber risk insurance coverage
Nowadays, companies are facing a variety of internal and external cyber threats—
cyber crime, hacktivism, cyber espionage and cyber war—and are affected by 
different forms of cyberattacks, such as denial of service, web-based attacks, 
malicious codes, viruses, worms and trojans, malware, malicious insiders, stolen 
devices as well as phishing and social engineering (Bendovschi 2015). The pos-
sible consequences of cyberattacks include theft, loss and destruction of data and 
information (Andrijcic and Horowitz 2006; McLaughlin 2011; Jouini et al. 2014; 
Amin 2019); failure and destruction of IT systems and software (Furnell and 
Warren 1999; McLaughlin 2011; Lagazio et al. 2014; Jouini et al. 2014; Roma-
nosky 2016); business interruption (Andrijcic and Horowitz 2006; Bendovschi 
2015; Amin 2019); disruption and destruction of production facilities (Lathrop 
and Stanisz 2016; Wu and Moon 2017; Elhabashy et al. 2019); disruption of pro-
duction and business processes and procedures (Hiller and Russell 2013; Lathrop 
and Stanisz 2016; Pereira et al. 2017; Kiss et al. 2019); and personal injury and 
property damage (Zelle and Whitehead 2014). Accordingly, cyberattacks cannot 
only result in considerable financial losses (Gandhi et al. 2011; Jouini et al. 2014) 
but also physical damage (Lathrop and Stanisz 2016; Amin 2019). However, the 
insurance coverage of existing cyber policies is primarily limited to financial 
losses resulting from cyberattacks (Böhme and Schwartz 2010; Haas and Hof-
mann 2014). Since cyber policies generally do not provide insurance coverage 
for physical damages and personal injuries resulting from cyberattacks (Lathrop 
and Stanisz 2016; Franke 2017), the different consequences of cyber incidents 
may also affect the insurance coverage from various traditional insurance poli-
cies, thus resulting in silent cyber coverage, unless the policies include coverage 
exclusions.
Cyber insurance coverage has been available since the late 1970s. The mar-
ket evolved from the technical risks/technical errors and omissions (E&O) sector. 
The 1980s saw the introduction of the first tech E&O insurance policies, which 
included cybersecurity insurance and were developed primarily for financial insti-
tutions as well as blue chip companies. The development and launch of cyber 
insurance as a stand-alone product was a response to the Y2K problem and was 
intended to close existing gaps in the insurance coverage of traditional property 
and casualty policies (Majuca et al. 2006; Camillo 2017).
Accordingly, cyber insurance is a comparatively new product (KPMG AG 
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft 2017a; DiGrazia 2018) offering considerable 
growth potential in the German market (KPMG AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesells-
chaft 2017b; Wrede et  al. 2018). With a total of 528 insurance companies and 
a premium volume of approximately EUR 202.4 billion in 2018, Germany is 
Europe’s third-largest and the world’s sixth-largest insurance market. In Europe, 
Germany, together with the U.K., is the leader in the area of non-life insurance, 
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among other things due to the comparatively great importance of industry and 
medium-sized commercial enterprises and the correspondingly high demand. In 
2018, for example, the premium volume of the 120 German insurers in the indus-
try/commercial/agricultural property insurance segment amounted to approxi-
mately EUR 6.9 billion. The 99 providers of engineering insurance had a pre-
mium volume of about EUR 2 billion, while the 42 companies in the credit, surety 
and fidelity insurance segment reached approximately EUR 1.7 billion (German 
Insurance Association (GDV) 2019).
In Germany, about 40 insurers and reinsurers offer cyber policies for busi-
ness customers (Flagmeier and Heidemann 2018). In 2017, the premium volume 
amounted to approximately EUR 100 million (KPMG AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsge-
sellschaft 2017b). In 2018, about 33% of all companies in Germany had cyber cov-
erage (Hiscox Ltd. 2018). Currently, the range of coverage for cyber risks in the 
cyber insurance market is highly segmented and primarily consists of a combina-
tion of traditional insurance products and independent cyber policies (Knutsen and 
Stempel 2018). Nonetheless, the cyber insurance market is still underdeveloped and 
underutilised (Anderson and Moore 2006; Zhao et al. 2013; Talesh 2018). However, 
the cyber insurance business is still relatively unattractive for providers, as highly 
IT-dependent companies mainly drive the demand for the corresponding insurance 
products and the market segment is still relatively limited (Bandyopadhyay et  al. 
2009).
As a result of the significant increase in provider-specific insurance coverage for 
cyber risks, the cyber insurance business is experiencing more substantial market 
growth and higher competition among companies (Kesan and Hayes 2017). The 
relevant literature includes several studies dealing with the investigation of cyber 
insurance markets in different countries (ENISA 2012; Choudhry 2014; Baban et al. 
2017a, b; Franke 2017; Strupczewski 2017; Eling and Zhu 2018; Flagmeier and Hei-
demann 2018; Bahşi et al. 2019; Cole and Fier 2020). For example, Eling and Zhu 
(2018) investigate the supply of cyber insurance by property and casualty insurers 
in the U.S. market. The market for cyber insurance products in Sweden is analysed 
by Franke (2017). By contrast, Baban et al. (2017a) focus on the analysis of glob-
ally important cyber insurance markets in Germany, Switzerland, the U.S. and the 
U.K., while Koezuka (2016) examines the design of cyber insurance products in the 
Japanese market. Additional studies on the supply of insurance coverage for cyber 
risks in the Polish (Strupczewski 2017), Norwegian (Bahşi et al. 2019) and German 
(Choudhry 2014; Baban et al. 2017b; Flagmeier and Heidemann 2018) markets are 
available.
For individual cyber insurance markets, major market barriers for the supply 
and demand of cyber policies are discussed (ENISA 2012; Baban et  al. 2017a, 
b). Information asymmetries and the global, interdependent and highly correlated 
damage potential of cyber risks are frequently cited as important market barri-
ers for the provision of cyber insurance (Baer and Parkinson 2007; Moore 2010; 
ENISA 2012; Young et  al. 2016; Baban et  al. 2017a, b; OECD 2017a; Bodin 
et  al. 2018). Furthermore, insufficient reinsurance capacity for the cyber insur-
ance business is identified in the literature as an obstacle on the supply side. This 
is caused by difficulties in quantifying the possible accumulation of cyber risks 
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(ENISA 2012; OECD 2017a). Lack of experience in claims settlement and a lack 
of historical data on the frequency and severity of cyber incidents also consti-
tute significant challenges to the provision of cyber insurance products (Baban 
et al. 2017a, b; Strupczewski 2017; EIOPA 2018b; Siegel et al. 2018). As a result, 
insurers are fundamentally uncertain as to whether, in the long term, the provi-
sion of cyber coverage is considered advantageous for individual companies or 
too risky (Baban et al. 2017a, b). Actuarially unclear data on the frequency and 
amount of cyber losses pose additional problems in calculating adequate pre-
miums for cyber coverage. Furthermore, the high adaptability and dynamics of 
cyber threats are important growth-inhibiting factors for the cyber insurance mar-
ket (Zhao et al. 2013). Shetty et al. (2018) emphasise that, in the long term, insur-
ers will be able to satisfy the corporate demand for cyber coverage only if the 
difficulties mentioned above are overcome.
According to Tøndel et al. (2015), the factors influencing cyber insurance demand 
have hardly been investigated to date. Further, when analysing corporate demand for 
cyber coverage, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2009) emphasise the limited importance of 
insurance solutions for companies in IT risk management. In principle, the com-
plexity and lack of transparency of the cyber insurance market has a restraining 
effect on the demand for cyber policies (Baban et al. 2017a, b). From the custom-
er’s perspective, the relatively high insurance premiums for cyber coverage (EIOPA 
2018b) and the lack of consideration of individual company needs in the design of 
insurance coverage (OECD 2017a; EIOPA 2018b) also represent notable barriers 
to the demand for cyber policies. In this context, Franke and Meland (2019) exam-
ine the discrepancies between the cyber coverages offered by insurers and customer 
expectations.
Furthermore, the literature describes the information deficit associated with the 
offered cyber insurance products and their scope of coverage (ENISA 2012, 2016; 
Baban et al. 2017a, b; Meland et al. 2017; EIOPA 2018b; Siegel et al. 2018) as well 
as the inadequate perception of cyber risks as the most important obstacles on the 
demand side (Moore 2010; Baban et al. 2017a, b; De Smidt and Botzen 2018; Eling 
2018). De Smidt and Botzen (2018) designate it a “not in my organisation effect”. 
Additionally, companies do not recognise the need to purchase cyber insurance, as 
decision  makers often assume that existing traditional insurance policies already 
provide comprehensive coverage against cyber risks (Beh 2001; Willis 2010; ENISA 
2012; U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Protection and Pro-
grams Directorate (NPPD) 2012; Her Majesty’s (HM) Government (UK) and Marsh 
Ltd. 2015; Marotta et al. 2015, 2017; OECD 2017a; Strupczewski 2017; Bodin et al. 
2018; Knutsen and Stempel 2018; Schanz 2018). This cannot only be attributed to 
the lack of transparency and comprehensibility of insurance terms and conditions 
and the contractually agreed service content of cyber policies (Baer 2003; Meland 
et al. 2015; Marotta et al. 2015, 2017) but also to the high degree of complexity of 
insurance products (Eling and Wirfs 2016; Strupczewski 2017). Therefore, it is dif-
ficult for insured companies to assess existing insurance coverage (Middleton and 
Kazamia 2016). Also, insurance products often do not provide sufficient coverage 
for companies in the event of a claim (Siegel et al. 2002; Gordon et al. 2003; Tore-
gas and Zahn 2014).
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The lack of demand for cyber coverage also results from companies’ lack of 
knowledge about the availability of cyber policies (Pain et  al. 2016), since most 
companies that have already been affected by a cyber incident generally decide to 
purchase cyber insurance (Shackelford 2012). In this context, Meland et al. (2017) 
analyse the uncertainty on the company side in dealing with novel cyber insurance. 
Accordingly, many companies often prefer to enhance existing insurance products 
with cyber coverage components rather than purchase independent cyber policies 
(Middleton and Kazamia 2016). Therefore, several authors point out the lack of 
understanding on both the supply and demand side as one of the most significant 
market barriers (Biener et al. 2015; EIOPA 2018b). In summary, according to Eling 
and Schnell (2016a, b) and Tøndel et al. (2015), more empirical research seems nec-
essary to examine the supply and demand sides.
Potential insurance coverage for cyber risks in traditional policies
There are only a few studies on systematic content analysis of the coverage and con-
tractual conditions of insurance solutions for cyber risks. In this context, the imma-
turity of the products currently on the market is increasingly criticised (Bandyo-
padhyay and Shidore 2011; Meland et al. 2015, 2017; Tøndel et al. 2016; DiGrazia 
2018). For example, Kesan et  al. (2005) analyse the scope of coverage for cyber 
policies in general, whereas Majuca et al. (2006) examine the changes and adjust-
ments in insurance coverage as the hacker insurance from the early 1990s evolved 
into the first independent cyber policies in the mid-2000s. Further, Baer and Parkin-
son (2007) show that the stand-alone cyber insurance policies of all leading insur-
ance companies covered losses due to business interruption at that time. Marotta 
et al. (2015, 2017) analyse the insurance coverage of 14 cyber policies of interna-
tionally active insurers, showing that first-party coverage generally includes loss 
or damage to digital assets, business interruption losses, cyber extortion and theft 
of money and digital assets. However, third-party coverage generally includes the 
assumption of costs for information security and privacy breaches, IT forensics, as 
well as customer notifications and reporting obligations for privacy incidents, multi-
media liability, loss of third-party data and third-party contractual indemnification.
Coburn et al. (2016) examine the coverage and product components of 26 cyber 
insurances from the U.K. insurance market. Talesh (2018) analyses the range of 
risk management services offered by over 30 cyber insurance products. Meanwhile, 
Woods et al. (2017) focus on the evaluation of content and structural design of appli-
cation documents for cyber insurance, which serve for the collection and documen-
tation of information on existing IT security measures in the companies. Franke 
(2018) examines the coverage of five cyber insurances and the business conditions 
of three electronic payment service providers regarding the coverage of defaults in 
electronic payment services. Romanosky et  al. (2019) evaluate the content of the 
coverage of over 100 cyber policies in the U.S. insurance market to gain insight into 
the underwriting process and an insurance-specific understanding of cyber risks 
and their pricing. A first systematic analysis of cyber coverage in traditional insur-
ance products was conducted by Haas (2016). However, this study is limited to the 
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examination of standard terms and conditions from the German Insurance Associa-
tion (GDV) for business liability, electronics, property, business interruption, data 
and software insurance.
In the legal literature, a few publications deal with the design of cyber coverage 
components in traditional insurance products. Hunt (2019), for example, discusses 
the incorporation of cyber coverage components in all-risk property, commercial 
general liability, commercial crime, terrorism and directors’ & officers’ (D&O) 
insurance for the commercial real estate sector from a theoretical perspective and 
with respect to the U.S. insurance market. Jerry II and Mekel (2001) describe cover-
age for cyber risks in selected traditional insurances (commercial general liability 
coverage, D&O coverage, E&O coverage, media coverage, as well as intellectual 
property infringement, prosecution and defence coverage).
Theoretical perspective on the jurisdiction regarding the coverage of silent cyber 
damages in Germany
The problem of the lack of transparency when it comes to interpreting the insur-
ance terms and conditions of traditional policies with regard to the effectiveness and 
interpretation of the risk inclusions or exclusions of silent cyber damages appears 
to be relevant for the German jurisprudence. International jurisdiction already deals 
with this question, as is shown, for example, by the court proceedings pending in 
the U.S. to clarify the effectiveness of the war exclusion clause in the Mondelez v. 
Zurich case. The corresponding statement of claim for USD 100 million was filed 
in October 2018 with the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. The company 
Mondelez International Inc. (Mondelez) had taken out an all-risk property insur-
ance policy from Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich) that included cov-
erage for physical loss or damage to electronic data, programmes or software and 
also physical loss or damage caused by the malicious introduction of a machine code 
or instruction. In June 2017, Mondelez fell victim to an attack by the malware pro-
gram ‘NotPetya’. As a result, 1700 servers and 24,000 laptops at Mondelez were 
permanently damaged and had to be replaced. According to Mondelez, this caused 
damages of well over USD 100 million for the company. This loss was reported to 
Zurich by the company. In June 2018, Zurich refused to cover Mondelez, citing the 
insurance policy’s war exclusion clause. To date, it appears that no final decision has 
been made in this lawsuit (Ferland 2019).
German insurers have so far only reported isolated cases of silent cyber damage.3 
For this reason, to the best of our knowledge, there have not yet been any legal pro-
ceedings in Germany to clarify silent cyber claims. From a theoretical perspective, 
in the case of legal proceedings in Germany, the courts would generally take into 
account different interpretative principles when trying to interpret risk inclusion and 
exclusion clauses with ambiguous wording.
3 For example, in 2019, in a survey of 27 insurers by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Author-
ity (BaFin) to examine non-affirmative cyber risks in insurance policies, only two insurance companies 
reported known silent cyber losses in Germany (see Grund 2020).
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Thus, the requirement of comprehensibility developed by the German jurisdic-
tion, which prescribes taking into account the policyholder’s interests when inter-
preting clauses, should apply. This should lead to assuming a broad interpretation 
of the regulations by the policyholders. They would interpret the inclusions rather 
generously since their interest is in the most widespread coverage possible. Theoret-
ically, in case of doubt, this means that insurance coverage exists for all risks unless 
they are explicitly excluded.
Furthermore, the general terms and conditions used by insurance companies are 
subject to the law on general terms and conditions of business. According to this, 
clauses contradict the transparency requirement developed by the German jurisdic-
tion and are therefore invalid if they are not clearly formulated and understandable. 
If there is any ambiguity in general insurance terms and conditions and, as a result, 
different alternatives for the application of the clause remain despite their interpreta-
tion, this ambiguity is usually at the expense of the insurer and the most favourable 
interpretation of the clause for the policyholder is then applicable. Ambiguity is typ-
ically assumed, e.g. in the own-damage clause common in D&O insurance policies 
or for the term damage event in general liability insurance (Pilz 2006).
Conversely, the principle of a narrow interpretation of risk exclusions in general 
insurance terms and conditions generally applies in order to protect the policyholder, 
so that insurance coverage is not reduced further than the apparent purpose of the 
clause requires. Theoretically, this results in the fact that, for silent cyber risks, the 
existing uncertainties regarding the scope of insurance coverage in traditional poli-
cies mean that the interpretation of risk inclusion and exclusion, as well as the defi-
nition of loss events from a legal perspective, increasingly need to be clarified in 
court proceedings. This serves the purpose of creating legal certainty for insurers 
and policyholders.
In summary, the lack of transparency in and the complexity of insurance terms 
and conditions and the content of cyber insurance policies, combined with the 
resulting insecurity of companies towards cyber coverage, are among the main rea-
sons for the lack of corporate demand for cyber insurance. Moreover, there is hith-
erto no systematic analysis in the literature on affirmative and silent cyber coverage 
and the resulting silent cyber risks associated with traditional insurance products. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study that examines traditional 




Due to the lack of context-specific research on the design of coverage for cyber risks 
in traditional insurance policies, as well as the explorative nature of our research 
objective, a qualitative research approach is used. Data are collected using two 
methods: (1) qualitative content analysis to examine general insurance terms and 
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conditions of different traditional product lines in the German market and (2) quali-
tative interviews with experts from the German insurance industry.
Data collection and analysis
Qualitative content analysis of general insurance terms and conditions
Methodologically, this study is based on a systematic evaluation of text documents 
(Miller and Alvarado 2005; Bowen 2009). The development of a scheme of catego-
ries based on the research objectives (Cavanagh 1997; Harwood and Garry 2003; 
Graneheim and Lundman 2004) and the coding of the text material using this dif-
ferentiated scheme of categories (Weber 1990; Elo and Kyngäs 2008; Vaismoradi 
et  al. 2013) is characteristic for qualitative content analysis. A content analysis of 
general insurance terms and conditions of select traditional product lines is carried 
out to examine insurance coverage for cyber risks. The general terms and conditions 
of insurance products represent a suitable data basis for the investigation because, on 
the one hand, they serve to describe the scope of the service and determine the insur-
ance coverage. Thus, they provide the customer with the actual contractual contents 
of the policy. On the other hand, the comprehensibility of the contractual condi-
tions and the contents are of central importance for customers’ purchasing decisions 
regarding insurance contracts (Mainelli 2012). Here, currently effective versions of 
general insurance terms and conditions of the selected insurance products are con-
sidered so that the research results are up-to-date.
The evaluation is carried out following Mayring’s model of qualitative content 
analysis, which enables a rule-based and systematic evaluation of the data (Mayring 
2015). Qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA is used to facilitate and system-
atically structure the coding process. Due to the nature of the available text material, 
a pragmatic and appropriate combination of the two analysis techniques inductive 
category formation and classifying structuring was carried out (Mayring 2015).
Since the categories are derived directly from the text material to be analysed 
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005), the method is particularly suitable for investigating 
practical phenomena as well as problems for which theories and literature are only 
available to a limited extent. Accordingly, the qualitative content analysis follows 
an inductive procedure for the formation of categories, meaning that individual cat-
egories are derived directly from the material without reference to existing theo-
retical concepts (Kondracki et al. 2002; Thomas 2006; Finfgeld-Connett 2014). This 
approach aims directly at drawing conclusions to answer the research objective and 
is employed on a small sample of texts. The complexity of the qualitative data mate-
rial will be stepwise and manually reduced by coding the documents (Potter and 
Levine-Donnerstein 1999). The data to be analysed are checked for relevant text seg-
ments, which are marked and given ‘text-related’ codes that describe the segment as 
precisely as possible (Gioia et al. 2013). The resulting scheme of primarily descrip-
tive codes is structured and transferred into categories. This is done by checking the 
existing descriptive codes for their analytical content and combining those with sim-
ilar meanings to create analytical categories. To those, further codes are assigned as 
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subcategories (Morse 2008; Graneheim et al. 2017). This content analytical scheme 
of categories forms the basis for the subsequent qualitative analysis.
Additionally, coding rules are formulated to ensure the text material is clearly 
assigned to categories. The rules are tested, adjusted and, if necessary, clarified and 
adapted. This would be based on parallel data analyses and frequent comparisons of 
the codings (Downe-Wamboldt 1992; Burla et al. 2008).
The entire text material was at first read several times to code it in successive 
steps, each increasing the level of abstraction, with a focus on the relevant text seg-
ments (Gioia et al. 2013). Based on the inductive category formation, a preliminary 
coding scheme is developed from the material through several iterations. It defines 
the aspects relevant to the analysis. As relevant coding units, individual cover com-
ponents—hazard, damage and costs—and claims exclusions are defined. The context 
unit is a business insurance line and the evaluation unit consists of all general insur-
ance terms and conditions of a single insurance line. A double-blind procedure, with 
two researchers developing the codes independently, is applied to guarantee coding 
quality (Guest et al. 2006). A complete test coding of parts of the text was carried 
out by the two researchers using the developed coding scheme to ensure a common 
understanding of the codes and their application. The researchers subsequently met 
to review the material as well as clarify and finalise the codes and categories.
Further, a description including a brief explanation of the code’s meaning and its 
intended use was developed. The research team, including the two coders, discussed 
this preliminary coding scheme. In the process, the authors agreed on its further 
development based on a comparison of the created codings. Particular attention was 
paid to the stability of the developed codes and the structural design of the coding 
scheme (Hennink et al. 2017).
The analysed text material was evaluated with regard to information security vio-
lations. If a text segment met this selection criterion, a new category was created for 
it, or it was assigned to an existing one. The definition of the different characteris-
tics of the categories by typification took place only after a complete passage of the 
material and the completion of the scheme. This was necessary to determine the 
maximum possible scope for each category and insurance line, as well as to create 
subcategories on this basis to ensure that the different characteristics of the indi-
vidual categories are well defined. The final category scheme contains a total of 38 
categories; 20 of them are main categories (see Fig. 1).
Subsequently, the coding of the remaining material was carried out independently 
by two researchers based on the final scheme, whereby uniform coding was ensured 
by regular coordination meetings and further checks of the scheme.
Sample and data
The database used comprises a total of 48 general terms and conditions from 
various traditional insurance lines. This study focuses on insurers operating in 
the German market with insurance lines serving corporate customers and falling 
under the jurisdiction of the respective primary Financial Supervisory Author-
ity of a DACH region country (Germany, Austria or Switzerland). These are 
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), the Austrian Financial 
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Market Authority (FMA) and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority 
(FINMA). The examined product lines are business content and income, business 
and professional liability, pecuniary loss liability, fidelity insurance and D&O 
insurance. These lines are typically associated with extensive cyber coverage in 
the literature (Cohen and Anderson 2000; Jerry II and Mekel 2001; ENISA 2012; 
Flagmeier and Heidemann 2018; Armbrüster 2020; Gebert and Klapper 2020) 
and they contain, according to practitioners’ opinion, significant silent cyber risks 
(Willis Towers Watson 2019). 4 The sample is the result of the multi-stage selec-
tion process described in Fig.  2. It is based on the flow chart according to the 
Fig. 1  Scheme of categories
4 To the best of our knowledge, the German insurance market has so far only seen isolated cases of silent 
cyber damages, and until now there are no known cases of legal disputes to clarify possible insurance 
coverage of silent cyber damages in traditional insurance lines. In contrast, in the U.S., particularly in the 
case of commercial general liability insurance and general property insurance, disputes frequently arise 
before U.S. courts between policyholders and insurers regarding the coverage of damages caused by data 
breaches, privacy violations and loss of network or computer functionality due to a cyberattack.
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PRISMA statement for the systematic selection of research objects (Moher et al. 
2009).
The information on the selected insurance companies stems from EIOPA and 
FINMA, which provide databases of the insurers they supervise. The two data-
bases contain data of all insurers operating in the German insurance market, 
Fig. 2  Flow diagram of the selection process
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falling within the responsibilities of the most relevant Financial Supervisory 
Authorities of the DACH region (BaFin, FMA and FINMA).
First, entries from EIOPA’s and FINMA’s company databases were transferred 
to separate Excel files. The file generated from EIOPA’s company database initially 
contained a total of 26,657 data sets and the one generated from FINMA’s database 
200. The individual data sets contained information on the names of the insurance 
companies, competent insurance supervisory authorities and business areas. It was 
possible to search the data records according to predefined selection criteria. Selec-
tion characteristics were chosen from the available information. While the first cri-
terion was the German insurance market as a business area, the second selection 
criterion looked at the responsible insurance supervisory authority. After the first 
selection step, the number of relevant data sets from EIOPA’s company database 
was reduced to 1416. The second criterion of the supervision by BaFin or FMA 
reduced the selection to 461 data sets. After the removal of duplicates, 404 data 
records remained. Since a further predefined selection by insurance type or business 
line was not possible, the remaining 404 data sets were screened manually using 
the information on the respective companies’ websites. As a result, 202 property 
and casualty insurers were selected. Finally, we manually re-examined which of the 
202 companies offered the insurance types relevant to the study. Based on the infor-
mation in EIOPA’s company database, the selection process identified 58 relevant 
insurers. In the same way, the data records in the Excel file containing the infor-
mation from FINMA’s company database were selected using the described pro-
cess and the criteria. After removing duplicates and selecting property and casualty 
insurers, 66 data records remained. This number was further reduced based on the 
results of the manual information search by the researchers. A total of eight data sets 
of relevant insurers could finally be identified in FINMA’s company database.
Merging the two Excel files yielded a database consisting of 66 data sets of insur-
ance companies active in the relevant product segments of the German insurance 
market that fall under the responsibility of BaFin, FMA or FINMA. Before merg-
ing the two Excel files, it was documented in which of the relevant insurance lines 
the selected companies were offering policies to identify the appropriate insurance 
terms and conditions. For this purpose, the websites of the relevant insurers were 
examined. A database consisting of a total of 178 insurance terms and conditions 
resulted.
Collection of the relevant general insurance terms and conditions of the policies 
began in August 2018. For this purpose, all 66 insurance companies were contacted 
via e-mail. Additionally, the researchers conducted a systematic internet-based 
search to obtain the documents for the relevant insurance lines from the insurers’ 
websites. As presented in Table 1, this resulted in the procurement of 48 of the 178 
(approximately 27%) contract terms classified as relevant.
Qualitative interviews with experts from the German insurance industry
Additionally, qualitative interviews with representatives from the German insur-
ance industry were performed in February and March 2020. A total of 33 compa-
nies from the primary insurance, reinsurance and industrial insurance brokerage 
671Affirmative and silent cyber coverage in traditional insurance…
businesses were contacted as potential interview partners. Ultimately, 10 experts 
participated in the survey, resulting in a response rate of 30.3%. All interviews were 
conducted via telephone in a semi-structured form (Harvey 1988; Sturges and Han-
rahan 2004; Cachia and Millward 2011) with a mixture of open questions allowing 
the interviewee to comment and expand on the subject more freely, and more spe-
cific questions requiring more precise answers. In preparation for the meetings, a 
questionnaire was developed and used for all the interviews. This questionnaire was 
sent to the experts beforehand in order for them to prepare and determine if it was 
recommendable to get further information or refer to additional experts. This survey 
includes various experts from different company areas. Table 2 displays the number 
of participants in the individual interviews and information regarding the experts’ 
profession.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed for the analysis (McLellan et  al. 
2003), which is based on Mayring’s qualitative content analysis (Mayring  2015). 
Two researchers independently analysed all transcriptions to identify different opin-
ions on the management of silent cyber exposure among the informants.
Results
Results of the qualitative content analysis of general insurance terms 
and conditions
Business content and business income insurance
Business content and business income insurance as property insurance offers cover-
age for damages resulting from insured risks, such as vehicle impact, burglary, rob-
bery, fire, water leakage or storm damage. Consequently, cyber risks are not explic-
itly addressed in this line of insurance. Therefore, the product-specific coverage 
design and individual product components may contain silent cyber coverage. This 
applies particularly to the insured risks of fire, water leakage and vehicle impact, as 
Table 1  Overview of insurance terms and conditions
Insurance line Total number of relevant 
insurance terms and condi-
tions
Number of insurance terms and 
conditions included in the analysis
Business content and income insurance 61 17
Business and professional liability 
insurance
58 15
Pecuniary loss liability insurance 23 4
Fidelity insurance 12 5
D&O insurance 24 7
Total 178 48
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cyberattacks can trigger them. The insurance coverage of all 17 examined policies in 
this line of business includes fire—triggered by blaze, explosion and impact or crash 
of an aircraft—and vehicle impact as named perils. Similarly, mains water damage 
due to incorrect operation or malfunctions of sprinkler systems is covered. In this 
respect, only two insurance policies contain explicit exclusions and three additional 
policies offer to include it as an optional extension. In total, silent cyber insurance 
coverage for losses caused by the above-mentioned insured perils as a result of 
cyberattacks exists in 15 analysed policies.
Furthermore, the insurance coverage of 15 of the 17 insurance products examined 
includes the reimbursement of costs resulting from the destruction of physical prop-
erty caused by cyberattacks in the form of silent cyber coverage. In addition, 15 pol-
icies also provide coverage in the form of silent cyber coverage for financial losses 
due to business interruptions as a result of cyberattacks. If cyberattacks trigger the 
insured risks in this insurance line and no explicit exclusions are defined, these poli-
cies provide insurance coverage for the resulting damages and costs. This insurance 
line thus contains a considerable amount of silent cyber risks.
Two insurance policies define specific risk and coverage exclusions for losses 
caused by either malicious software or unauthorised actions and data misuse as a 
result of an unauthorised intrusion into computer systems. Standard exclusions for 
claims in connection with wars, civil unrest or nuclear energy are part of all exam-
ined contracts. One policy contains an explicit exclusion of cover for damages 
caused by employees. It is therefore highly probable that this policy does not pro-
vide insurance coverage for cybersecurity incidents caused by employees.
Business interruption coverage is a component in this line of insurance, which 
needs to be purchased additionally. If it is not added to a possible risk (e.g. fire), 
only the actual damages of the basis risk and not the loss of earnings are covered. 
Assuming that the policy includes a business interruption add-on, a cybersecurity 
incident triggering an insured risk will also result in payments based on this compo-
nent. Therefore this add-on contains silent cyber risk as well. However, some limita-
tions are generally included in the contracts.
Business and professional liability insurance
Business and professional liability insurance generally covers personal injury and 
property damage, as well as any resulting financial losses. Here, only the liabil-
ity claims under private law of the affected parties are covered. Insofar as the 15 
policies examined offer protection in the event of information security breaches, 
the scope of insurance coverage is very homogeneous and the insured benefits are 
almost identical across products. Accordingly, the insurance coverage of all ana-
lysed insurance policies for information security breaches includes, on the one hand, 
the classic benefits of liability insurance, such as defence against unjustified claims 
for damages, reimbursement of legal costs for the enforcement of claims for dam-
ages and release of the policyholder from justified claims for damages. On the other 
hand, in these cases, the insurance coverage of three policies additionally includes 
coverage for damages due to data alterations, disruptions of access to an electronic 
data exchange at third parties, violation of personal rights and rights to a name 
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and assumption of the costs for the recovery or recording of data not or incorrectly 
recorded. Insurance coverage for claims for damages arising from contractual liabil-
ity is not included in any of the policies examined. However, if the policies exclude 
coverage for losses caused by information security violations, an optional extension 
for these risks is sometimes offered. For example, the available coverage extensions 
refer to the coinsurance of financial losses caused by data deletion, data protection 
violations or losses caused by electronic data transfer and internet use.
Pecuniary loss liability insurance
Pecuniary loss liability insurance covers pure financial losses. Therefore, all four 
examined policies from this line have identical coverage. For example, all policies 
include coverage for the financial losses of third parties in the event of violations 
committed during the exercise of professional activities. The insurance coverage 
includes legal liability regulations under private law, the assessment of liability 
issues, defence against unjustified claims for damages and indemnification of the 
policyholder against justified claims for damages. In all policies examined, there is 
no evidence of explicit coverage inclusions or exclusions addressing information 
security breaches. Thus, these products contain significant silent cyber coverage.
Fidelity insurance
Fidelity insurance offers companies protection against financial losses generated by 
white-collar crime. Generally, insurance coverage is provided for losses caused by 
deliberate unauthorised actions by company employees or other trusted persons of 
the company. These policies thus close the gaps in the insurance coverage of busi-
ness and professional liability insurance, as well as financial loss liability insurance, 
that exist due to the exclusion of the risks associated with criminal offences. Fur-
ther, this insurance also covers certain IT risks; for instance, there is coverage for 
financial losses caused by the tortious actions of outside third parties. Generally, the 
insurance provides coverage for losses resulting from the betrayal of secrets, as well 
as computer and data misuse. Additionally, the scope of coverage may also include 
the reimbursement of specific costs (i.e. IT, loss investigation and prosecution or 
public relations costs) (Seitz 2011).
In the event of an information security breach, all five policies examined include 
coverage for damages caused by unauthorised interference by third parties in the 
company’s own IT systems, with or without the intention of personal enrichment, as 
well as the assessment of liability issues. Additionally, they cover damages caused 
by internal offenders as well as the assumption of costs incurred for IT forensics, 
legal prosecution and damage assessment. In contrast, the assumption of costs 
for the reacquisition and recovery of data or software products is only included in 
four policies. The reimbursement of notification costs in the event of data protec-
tion breaches is incorporated in the insurance coverage of two of the policies exam-
ined. Similarly, all policies examined cover losses resulting from spying on busi-
ness secrets by third parties, including financial compensation for lost corporate 
profits. Additionally, the policies examined offer continued insurance coverage for 
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specific risks beyond the end of the contract for a period of up to three years. For 
losses caused by virus waves, extortion or ransom demands, the policies analysed 
either contain explicit coverage exclusions or no implicit or explicit risk inclusions 
or exclusions could be identified. While insurance coverage for reputational dam-
age is generally excluded in all policies, four insurance companies cover at least the 
costs for their reduction. For business interruptions caused by information security 
breaches, four of the policies examined include temporary insurance coverage. Fur-
thermore, three insurance policies also cover the assumption of contractual fines and 
defence costs in the event of cyber damage.
Directors’ and officers’ insurance
D&O insurance protects executive employees against a possible claim for financial 
losses resulting from a breach of duty committed in the course of their professional 
activities. Furthermore, all seven policies examined include insurance coverage for 
individually contractually-agreed-upon claims for damages, insofar as these arise 
from legal liability provisions. In addition, defence against unjustified claims for 
damages and reimbursement of external legal costs for the enforcement of claims 
for damages on behalf of the policyholder are included in the scope of benefits of 
all insurance products. Moreover, the insurance coverage of six of the seven policies 
examined incorporates the assumption of costs by the insurer for measures to reduce 
the client’s reputational damage. Overall, the terms and conditions of all seven ana-
lysed insurance contracts show a different design and significant differences in the 
used formulations. No policy contains any unambiguous formulations that point 
to comprehensive affirmative insurance coverage for cyber damage. Hitherto, the 
terms and conditions of all seven analysed D&O insurance policies do not explic-
itly exclude coverage for cyber risks so that such claims are covered. Consequently, 
based on the content of the insurance terms and conditions and their formulations, it 
can be concluded that silent cyber coverage exists in this insurance line.
A summary of the results of the analysis of the above-mentioned insurance lines 
is given in Table 3.
Results of the qualitative expert interviews
The perception of silent cyber exposures and the implementation status of measures 
to deal with silent cyber risks show significant differences among the insurers sur-
veyed. This is an exemplary expression for the German insurance industry still being 
in the early stages of dealing with silent cyber exposures compared to other interna-
tional insurance markets.
Although all insurers take non-affirmative cyber risks into account in their risk man-
agement, the risk potential of silent cyber exposures for their own business is assessed 
very differently. Reinsurers generally place greater importance on silent cyber expo-
sures, as these companies have been dealing with the issue for some time. One pri-
mary insurer surveyed rated the significance of silent cyber exposures as low due to its 
limited product portfolio. Thus, the company generally refrains from excluding silent 
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cyber coverage and instead offers a complementary product component to cover cyber 
losses in traditional policies. Another primary insurer has already analysed all the terms 
and conditions for silent cyber exposures since 2017 and adjusted them accordingly. 
Consequently, the company currently has only explicit risk inclusions or exclusions for 
cyber risks in all policies. Another company only started an active exchange with other 
insurers on the subject of silent cyber in 2019 and is now preparing an analysis of its 
terms and conditions without yet having specified concrete business policy measures 
for dealing with silent cyber risks.
The total number of identified cases of silent cyber damage at the interviewed com-
panies is very low so far. Due to the scarcity of experience and data on silent cyber 
claims, the risk models used in the risk management of the surveyed companies are 
primarily based on expert knowledge. However, they do not possess sufficient expertise 
on cyber risks, so building up expert knowledge to assess and quantify silent cyber 
exposures is of high priority. Additionally, reinsurers are essential partners from the 
perspective of all primary insurers surveyed, as they have better databases on cyber 
losses and more IT know-how. By making these resources available to primary insur-
ers, they can act as service providers.
For accumulation control, seven of the insurers surveyed used scenario-based catas-
trophe models, which are predominantly based on approaches for the modelling of nat-
ural catastrophe risks. One of the primary insurers also plans to use a scenario-based 
catastrophe model to analyse silent cyber exposures and is currently preparing a project 
to introduce a corresponding modelling approach. However, from the perspective of 
all the reinsurers in the sample, the catastrophe models currently used to model silent 
cyber exposures are still not sophisticated enough, since the bases for the proposed 
catastrophic cyber risk scenarios are mostly dependent on qualitative assumptions and 
expert assessments. Due to the lack of data on silent cyber claims, one reinsurer uses 
cyber insurance claims data to analyse potential silent cyber exposures in traditional 
lines of business. Three of the companies surveyed are also conducting advanced risk 
assessments and stress tests to better assess the impact of cyber loss scenarios on insur-
ance portfolios in traditional lines of business.
For the pricing of affirmative cyber coverage in traditional lines of business, reinsur-
ers make use of existing pricing tools for cyber insurance contracts. In contrast, so far 
only one of the primary insurers surveyed takes affirmative cyber coverage into account 
in the pricing without, however, disclosing a separate premium for this in the risk cal-
culation for the client.
In the case of the reinsurers, existing silent cyber coverage in the contracts of the 
traditional lines of business have in many cases been eliminated by general exclusions 
and subsequent standard re-inclusions of specific cyber-related risks combined with 
additional sublimits. In the meantime, German primary insurance companies have also 
begun to implement similar measures.
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Discussion
The results demonstrate that the examined traditional policies offer limited cov-
erage for cyber damages. From the insurers’ perspective, the definition of the 
insured risk in the traditional insurance lines is particularly complicated, given 
the constant development and high complexity of cyber threats. Existing risk def-
initions in the terms and conditions should be reformulated and expanded so that 
inclusions or exclusions become more evident for policyholders (ENISA 2017). 
Furthermore, silent coverage offers considerable cyber liability potential in the 
examined traditional insurance lines, which could potentially even amount to sys-
temic risk.
Moreover, terms and conditions often contain imprecise wording of contract 
contents and insufficient descriptions of the scope of coverage of the insurance 
policies. However, through the language and formulations used in the terms 
and conditions, the insurance companies decisively determine the design of the 
offered insurance coverage and support the development and subsequent estab-
lishment of uniform definitions in the contracts (ENISA 2017; Woods and Simp-
son 2017). Consequently, the examined policies show significant differences in 
their content due to the respective formulations. For example, the majority of 
the insurance terms and conditions do not contain standardised definitions of the 
term ‘information security violation’ as a triggering factor for determining the 
insured event. Some contractual terms and conditions exhibit apparent differences 
in the definition and classification of the term ‘information security violation’. 
Additionally, the terms and conditions sometimes contain different wordings in 
the descriptions of the contractually defined benefits, although the individual 
components of the insurance coverage are similar in design.
Thus, the wording used in the terms and conditions of the insurance policies 
causes uncertainty for insurers and customers concerning existing insurance cov-
erage as well as inclusions and exclusions for cyber risks. This makes it consid-
erably more difficult for insurers to identify silent coverage and to estimate the 
existing cyber liability potential. Further, the insured companies can only make 
inadequate assessments of their current insurance coverage for cyber damages 
(Carter and Enoizi 2020).
The results of the expert interviews show that the German insurance industry 
is still in the early stages of dealing with silent cyber exposures compared to other 
international insurance markets. Although insurers are aware of the existing cyber 
liability potentials in their property and liability portfolios and have begun to ana-
lyse the terms and conditions, no uniform implementation status of measures for 
managing silent cyber risks is discernible in the market. Primary insurers, in par-
ticular, should develop a holistic strategy for managing silent cyber risks and the 
resulting inherent accumulation exposure in order to convert existing silent cyber 
coverage into affirmative insurance solutions. This would also be advantageous 
in relation to the supervisory authorities and rating agencies, in order to demon-
strate effective risk management with regard to the underwriting of cyber risks.
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Depending on the individual implementation level of measures to manage 
silent cyber risks, reinsurers can support primary insurers by providing a compre-
hensive range of services. Examples include knowledge exchange, training, provi-
sion of wording manuals, accumulation risk assessments, claims data collections 
and the development of interactive scenario-based analysis tools for risk assess-
ment and visualisation (e.g. through heat maps) in underwriting. In addition, 
there are a few products from InsurTechs that help insurers examine the extent 
of silent cyber exposures in their traditional lines of business through automated 
analyses.
By using scenario-based risk analyses, it is possible to model the development 
and potentially damaging effects of different cyberattack scenarios. This permits 
the transparent assessment and forecasting of potential loss developments, includ-
ing possible accumulative losses on the level of the insurance contract portfolio for 
cyber insurance and silent cyber exposures in traditional insurance lines. Based on 
historical cyber damage data, the use of cyber risk heat maps in the context of a risk 
assessment allows the visualisation of the probability of occurrence and extent of 
damages due to cyber risks. This provides underwriters with a holistic picture, pro-
viding information on company-specific cyber exposure. It also provides the oppor-
tunity to identify potential cyber risk hot spots for a variety of industry sectors.
Assuming that most contracts with silent cyber exposure have no effective limita-
tion, it should be in regulators’ interest to support and even enforce the establish-
ment of effective risk management by the insurers. This is even more apparent since 
one large or multiple small-but-connected cyber events might have a substantial or 
even systemic impact. The financial consequences can translate into limited capaci-
ties for other insurance lines and into a fire sale of some assets. The former would 
have effects exclusively on the insurance market, while the latter could cause chain 
reactions in the whole capital market. Even the failure of just one insurer could have 
substantial effects on the insurance market through possible reputational damage. 
This should justify some reactions by regulators, which could affect individual com-
panies (e.g. higher capital requirements) or the whole market (e.g. legal upper limits, 
mandatory reinsurance, a risk pool or even state-guaranteed reinsurance).
Another option for the regulator, or a public–private partnership, in Germany 
could be the development and provision of uniform tools for detecting and reporting 
cyber damages in traditional lines of business. This could be a shared data pool on 
cyber claims, which also allows for a differentiation between silent and affirmative 
cyber damages. With the help of this database, insurers would be able to analyse 
their silent cyber risks, including accumulation exposures. This would also help the 
calculation of appropriate insurance premiums.
To set up such a data pool, however, an appropriate legal framework must be 
established by the government or a legally secure construct needs to be created 
for the organisation to be founded. This applies in particular with regard to com-
petition law, as the combination of data could violate current legislation (Eling 
and Schnell 2016a, b). Moreover, legal clarification is also required as to which 
cyber damage data may be legally collected, stored and exchanged across compa-
nies (Falco et al. 2019). However, when setting up such a data pool, implementing 
the right incentives for large insurers to provide the necessary data might prove 
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difficult (U.S. Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) National Protection 
and Programs Directorate  (NPPD) 2012; Tøndel et  al. 2016; Woods and Simp-
son 2017), as they see too little benefit in such cooperation for themselves (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) National Protection and Programs 
Directorate  (NPPD) 2012; Tøndel et  al. 2016; Siegel et  al. 2018). This would 
mean that only insurers with limited databases would make their data available by 
actively participating in the information exchange (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security  (DHS) National Protection and Programs Directorate  (NPPD) 2012; 
Woods and Simpson 2017).
In order for customers to ensure adequate insurance coverage against cyber 
risks, they should actively involve insurers, experienced brokers or other respec-
tive experts to conduct a risk analysis, discuss the results intensively and arrange 
for the corresponding coverage. This makes it possible to identify unknown over-
lapping coverage from different lines of business and to eliminate gaps in the 
coverage. However, this often does not take place because all parties involved 
have little interest in such time-consuming and information-intensive exchanges. 
In general, all parties involved are interested in an efficient assessment process, 
while clients in particular tend to provide as little data as possible (U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security  (DHS) National Protection and Programs Directo-
rate (NPPD) 2012; Tøndel et al. 2016) and intermediaries are subject to conflicts 
of interest (Yusuf 2011).
In the event of a conflict, the German jurisdiction would be the final author-
ity on the interpretation of the insurance terms and conditions and would thus 
contribute to improving transparency. In case of doubt, the predominant interpre-
tation, according to the principle of an average policyholder, already suggests a 
customer-friendly interpretation. The future influence of the jurisdiction is cur-
rently unclear as there are still no legal proceedings to clarify silent cyber in Ger-
many and, therefore, no court or supreme court decisions exist to date.
Although this article provides initial insights into the existence of affirmative 
and silent insurance protection from cyber risks and the resulting silent cyber 
coverage for selected traditional lines of business, the approach chosen here is 
not without limitations. Because of the chosen sample size, the results of the 
qualitative study are limited in their generalisability and representativeness (Fire-
stone 1993; Miles and Huberman 1994). For example, biases may exist due to the 
selection process of the investigated objects and the choice of interviewees. The 
former is a selection of insurance lines based exclusively on the literature, while 
the whole evaluation targets only one single national insurance market.
Furthermore, the limitations of the sample selection should be considered 
when interpreting the results. This study focuses on the analysis of specific tra-
ditional insurance lines in the German insurance market. Since the design of the 
insurance coverage and product components of the various policies in diverse 
product lines can differ significantly, the results can only be transferred to other 
lines of insurance to a limited extent. Also, this study focuses on the German 
insurance market, limiting the transferability of the results to other countries 
since country-specific features and particularities are reflected in both the design 
of coverage and the framework that each national insurance market provides. 
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Similarly, qualitative interviews were conducted within the scope of the study 
exclusively with experts from German companies. For example, a subsequent 
investigation could provide a survey of experts from other international insurance 
markets to gain additional valuable insights into the way insurers deal with silent 
cyber risks.
As described, only general insurance terms and conditions were used for the con-
tent analysis, being either provided by the contacted insurers or accessible on the insur-
ers’ websites. As a result, the insurance terms and conditions of the insurance lines not 
addressed in this study may contain further affirmative and silent cyber coverage that is 
not apparent due to the limited amount of data available for content analysis. However, 
most insurance policies offered on the German market within the considered product 
lines have a similar range of coverage and comparable product components. Further 
research, e.g. in the form of quantitative studies, is needed to validate our results with a 
more comprehensive data set and to generalise the findings. Additional insurance lines 
in the German market could be included and existing silent cyber exposures compared. 
Accordingly, additional quantitative and qualitative studies could generate valuable 
knowledge on the existence, design and management of affirmative and silent cyber 
coverage in different traditional insurance products on the one hand and other countries 
on the other hand.
Conclusion
Traditional insurance lines are increasingly affected by claims resulting from cyber 
risks. As a result, insurance companies also face the challenge of identifying and quan-
tifying silent cyber exposures in traditional insurance lines. However, this is made more 
difficult by the design of the terms and conditions of individual insurance lines. These 
largely determine the definition and scope of insurance coverage. Further, general 
insurance terms and conditions almost always contain imprecise wordings and insuf-
ficient descriptions of the contractually specified insurance coverage.
We used Mayring’s qualitative content analysis to examine general insurance terms 
and conditions of different traditional product lines in the German market with regard 
to the design of affirmative and silent cyber coverages. Additionally, interviews with 
German insurance experts were conducted to evaluate how insurers understand and 
manage their silent cyber exposures. Overall, the findings show a partial exposure in 
different insurance lines due to the current design of the terms and conditions. This 
causes a considerable amount of silent cyber coverage, which can even lead to systemic 
effects. Since the German insurance market is still in an early stage of tackling silent 
cyber risks, insurers have not yet developed holistic strategies for managing silent cyber 
exposures. Silent cyber exposures require systematic identification and quantification 
since the involved claims burdens are hard to estimate for insurers. Also, national and 
European insurance supervisory authorities increasingly pay attention to the problem 
of silent cyber exposures.
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